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Non-technical summary
‘Discourses of climate delay’ pervade current debates on climate action. These discourses
accept the existence of climate change, but justify inaction or inadequate efforts. In contem-
porary discussions on what actions should be taken, by whom and how fast, proponents of
climate delay would argue for minimal action or action taken by others. They focus attention
on the negative social effects of climate policies and raise doubt that mitigation is possible.
Here, we outline the common features of climate delay discourses and provide a guide to iden-
tifying them.
Technical summary
Through our collective observations as social scientists studying climate change, we describe
12 climate delay discourses and develop a typology based on their underlying logic. Delay dis-
courses can be grouped into those that: (1) redirect responsibility; (2) push non-transforma-
tive solutions; (3) emphasize the downsides of climate policies; or (4) surrender to climate
change. These discourses are distinct from climate denialism, climate-impact scepticism
and ad hominem attacks, but are often used in combination to erode public and political sup-
port for climate policies. A deeper investigation of climate delay discourses is necessary in
order to understand their prevalence and to develop inoculation strategies that protect the
public from their intended effects. Our typology enables scientists, climate advocates and pol-
icymakers to recognize and counter these arguments when they are used. We urge all propo-
nents of climate action to address these common misrepresentations of the climate crisis and
to better communicate the dramatic pace of global warming, the gravity of its impacts and the
possibility of effective and just mitigation policies.
Social media summary
Discourses of climate delay: redirect responsibility, push non-transformative solutions,
emphasize downsides, surrender.
1. Introduction
As the public conversation on climate change evolves, so too does the sophistication and range
of arguments used to downplay or discount the need for action (McKie, 2019; Norgaard,
2011). A mainstay of this counter-movement has been outright denial of the reality or
human causation of climate change (Farrell et al., 2019), supplemented by climate-impact
scepticism (Harvey et al., 2018) and ad hominem attacks on scientists and the scientific con-
sensus (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). A fourth strategy has received relatively little attention to
date: policy-focused discourses that exploit contemporary discussions on what action should
be taken, how fast, who bears responsibility and where costs and benefits should be allocated
(Bohr, 2016; Jacques & Knox, 2016; McKie, 2019). We call these ‘climate delay’ discourses,
since they often lead to deadlock or a sense that there are intractable obstacles to taking action.
Climate delay discourses comprise many separate strategies, some of which have already
been identified, such as individualism (Maniates, 2001), technological optimism (Peeters
et al., 2016), fossil fuel greenwashing (Sheehan, 2018) and appeals to social justice and eco-
nomic costs (Bohr, 2016; Jacques & Knox, 2016). They have been examined in surveys and
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community workshops (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Norgaard,
2011), in media sources and advertisements (Bohr, 2016;
Jacques & Knox, 2016; Peeters et al., 2016; Sheehan, 2018) and
in lobbying activities and political discourses (Bache et al.,
2015; Gillard, 2016; McKie, 2019), using methods such as content
analysis (Bohr, 2016; Jacques & Knox, 2016), grounded theory
(Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002) and the analysis of social deviance
(McKie, 2019). Many delay arguments are documented in key
works tracing the history of environmental counter-movements
in the USA, including the Merchants of Doubt, Deceit and
Denial, The Triumph of Doubt and others (Brulle & Aronczyk,
2019; Freudenburg et al., 2008; Markowitz & Rosner, 2003;
Michaels, 2008, 2020; Oreskes & Conway, 2011).
Our goal in this article is simply to identify an expansive –
albeit not necessarily exhaustive – list of climate delay discourses.
In doing so, we follow similar efforts to compile common climate
denial claims and provide a reference point for countering misin-
formation (www.skepticalscience.com). Our secondary goal is to
examine the common features and shared underlying logic of
delay discourses. This allows us to condense them into a set of
overarching strategies that can be more easily recognized and
hence challenged. Our approach is deductive: we derive our initial
list of discourses from an expert elicitation of the study
co-authors, and then we refine these categories by drawing from
a wide range of sources. These include a systematically collected
sample of written testimony (submitted to Massachusetts legisla-
ture on climate and clean energy legislation in the period
2013–2018), as well as selected news articles and media content
on climate policies in Germany, the UK, Norway and the USA.
Refer to the Supplementary Materials for a more detailed explan-
ation of our methods and sources.
Climate delay discourses repeatedly occur across sources, actors
and contexts. What features do they share? Based on the under-
lying logic they use to discourage climate action, we characterize
discourses of delay as negations of at least one of four questions:
(1) Is it our responsibility to take actions? (2) Are transformative
changes necessary? (3) Is it desirable to mitigate climate change,
given the costs? (4) Is it still possible to mitigate climate change?
The varying positions to these fundamental questions allow us to
group discourses into four categories that ‘redirect responsibility’,
‘push non-transformative solutions’, ‘emphasize the downsides’ of
climate policy, or ‘surrender’ to climate change (see Figure 1).
This typology assists in the identification of diverse discursive
strategies and may suggest tailored responses to each. These ques-
tions also cut to some of the most contentious aspects of social
and political change; they indicate that discourses of delay often
Fig. 1. A typology of climate delay discourses.
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contain partial truths and may be put forward in good faith. Yet
our focus here is to identify the features of these discourses, rather
than to attribute underlying motives to those who use them. In
the absence of high-quality public deliberation, and in the
hands of interest groups fighting against regulation, our concern
is that discourses of delay will disorientate and discourage ambi-
tious climate action. This issue thus demands urgent attention
and a new set of responses to facilitate a more robust public
debate on climate change mitigation (Farrell et al., 2019; van
der Linden et al., 2017). In the following sections, we discuss
the main features of our typology and the 12 discourses of
delay. Attributions for the quotes, as well as a more extensive
list of examples, can be found in the Supplementary Material
for this article.
2. Redirect responsibility
Who is responsible for taking climate action? Policy statements
can become discourses of delay if they purposefully evade respon-
sibility for mitigating climate change. A prominent example is
individualism, which redirects climate action from systemic solu-
tions to individual actions, such as renovating one’s home or
driving a more efficient car. This discourse narrows the solution
space to personal consumption choices, obscuring the role of
powerful actors and organizations in shaping those choices and
driving fossil fuel emissions (Maniates, 2001). Blame shifting in
this way can be explicit – “Yale’s guiding principles are predicated
on the idea that consumption of fossil fuels, not production, is
the root of the climate change problem” (Yale University). But
it can also be implicit, such as in the social media campaign
run by BP – “Our ‘Know your carbon footprint’ campaign suc-
cessfully created an experience that not only enabled people to
discover their annual carbon emissions, but gave them a fun
way to think about reducing it – and to share their pledge with
the world.”
This is not to suggest that individual actions are futile. Rather,
a more productive discourse of responsibility would focus atten-
tion on the collective potential of individual actions to stimulate
normative shifts and build pressure towards regulation. It would
also recognize that regulations and structural shifts are comple-
mentary to supporting individual behaviour change.
A second widely deployed discourse argues that other coun-
tries or states produce more greenhouse gas emissions and thus
bear a greater responsibility for taking action. We call this whata-
boutism. Actors advancing this discourse often deploy statistics
demonstrating their own small contribution to global emissions,
or they point to large emitters such as China – “We are a nation
that produces 1.8 per cent of global carbon dioxide, so I do not get
closing down our aluminium smelters, most of our steel produc-
tion, and now our refining industry …” (UK politician Nigel
Farage). Industries and sectors can also leverage this argument.
Transport organizations call for the agriculture sector to take pri-
ority actions – “A CO2-price might be a good idea in principle,
but we think it does not work if the land transport sector is
singled out. First one should see that agriculture is included
too” (anonymous quote, board member of a car manufacturer)
– while agricultural organizations do the exact opposite – “Ever
wonder why farmers feel targeted when it comes to climate
action? Have a look at data from yesterday’s @EPAIreland climate
report. Clearly, the first climate action we can all do is use cars
which are less carbon intensive. #backingfarming” (Irish
Farmers Association Twitter account).
An underlying concern in these narratives is the ‘free rider’
problem: unless all individuals, industries or countries undertake
emissions reductions, some will stand to benefit from the actions
of others. We see this more explicitly formulated in the ‘free rider’
excuse discourse, which claims that others will actively take
advantage of those who lead on climate change mitigation –
“[I]f we stopped emitting altogether tomorrow, not only it
would have no impact but undoubtedly other countries would
simply increase their emissions” (Josh Manuatu, president of
the Australian Young Liberals). In Donald Trump’s words, the
Paris Agreement is “less about the climate and more about
other countries gaining a financial advantage over the United
States.”
These three ‘redirect responsibility’ discourses grapple with the
real challenge of building a fair and comprehensive response to
climate change. Yet too often they set unrealistic conditions for
taking action, implying that others should take the lead before
we consider action ourselves. In doing so, they downplay or
shirk short-term entry points to climate engagement and policy,
including the considerable advantages gained by multiple entities
acting together across scales.
3. Push non-transformative solutions
Are transformative changes necessary? Policy statements can
become discourses of delay when they promote ineffective solu-
tions and thereby draw attention away from more substantial
and effective measures. Technological optimism is a prime
example, holding that technological progress will rapidly bring
about emissions reductions in the future. This discourse has
many variations, from touting recent progress in renewable
energy deployment, to promoting technological ‘myths’ that fail
to manifest in the promised timeframe and tend to be substituted
by new ones (e.g., zero-carbon planes, fusion power and direct air
capture of greenhouse gases) (Peeters et al., 2016), to even more
vague suggestions that “human ingenuity is infinite,” even if
Earth’s resources are not (Cato Institute commentary). Such opti-
mism and faith may be warranted in some cases, but this dis-
course is often accompanied by empirically unsupported claims:
for instance, that technological progress requires only market-
based incentives, rather than regulation; that breakthroughs are
imminent (“I am told that electric planes are on the horizon,”
UK Health Secretary Matt Hancock); or that rapid renewable
deployment makes stringent policies or demand reduction mea-
sures unnecessary.
A failure to acknowledge disruptive approaches to climate
mitigation can also be seen in fossil fuel solutionism, the claim
that the fossil fuel industry is “part of the solution to the scourge
of climate change” (OPEC Secretary General Mohammed
Barkindo). This discourse is at the heart of industry pushback
against regulation. The American Petroleum Institute funds tens
of millions of dollars’ worth of advertisements that promote
‘cleaner’ fossil fuels, while emotively linking these products to
everyday activities and human well-being (Sheehan, 2018). This
narrative stands in stark contrast to the established evidence –
that new freely emitting fossil infrastructures are incompatible
with the Paris Agreement’s target of 1.5°C warming.
Another key strategy here is to establish narrow definitions of
success, so that a country or industry can declare their leadership
in the fight against climate change. We call this all talk, little
action, a discourse that points to recent advances in lowering
emissions (often based on relative measures) or in setting
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ambitious climate targets, thus downplaying the need for more
stringent or new types of additional action (Gillard, 2016).
Ambitious long-term target setting may satisfy domestic demands
for climate policy, but without concrete instruments, these targets
are not guaranteed to translate into action on the ground (Bache
et al., 2015). This strategy is apparent, for example, when the UK
government responds to a specific parliamentary question on cli-
mate policy by arguing, “The UK has a world-leading record in
tackling climate change. We are rightly proud of our performance
against our carbon targets … We remain firmly committed to
tackling the threat of climate change,” while not providing any
direct response to the question asked.
On a more ideological level, many actors appear to shy away
from restrictive policies altogether. A discourse of no sticks, just
carrots argues that we should only pursue voluntary policies (‘car-
rots’), in particular those that expand consumer choices, such as
funding high-speed rail to substitute flights. More obviously
restrictive measures (‘sticks’) such as taxes or a frequent-flyer
levy are deemed too ‘paternalistic’ and overburdening for citizens.
This discourse argues that such measures should be abandoned,
despite the complementarity between ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ and
the need for both approaches under strong climate policy. A
good illustration is the German Free Democratic Party’s strategy
on climate action, which emphasizes that “greater efficiency
reduces energy, resource use, and emissions, while improving
quality of life,” but refuses to “prescribe sustainable behaviour
through regulations.”
The push towards incremental solutions tends to avoid all
options that are most threatening to existing power structures
and practices. In doing so, these discourses leverage narrow defi-
nitions of success, positive framings and entrepreneurial values
above transformative efforts and binding standards. When not
confronted with scientific deliberation and debate on appropriate
policy options, they provide cover for ongoing unsustainable
activities and hinder strong near-term climate action.
4. Emphasize the downsides
Given the costs, is it desirable to mitigate climate change? Policy
statements can become discourses of delay when they emphasize
the downsides of climate action and imply that these carry an
even greater burden for society than the consequences of inaction.
This fallacy is at risk of occurring in many contemporary discus-
sions on the potential social effects of climate policies, such as on
employment, prospects of foregone consumption, general pros-
perity and ‘ways of life’. In particular, this framing may resonate
for low-income members of society, marginalized communities
and developing nations.
The appeal to social justice moves social impacts to the fore-
front of policy discussions, framing a transition to renewable
energy as burdensome and costly to society: “we can’t allow cli-
mate protection to jeopardize prosperity and jobs” (German
Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier).
Such issues are a legitimate and crucial aspect of climate policy
deliberation, so one should carefully address these claims. For
instance, are other aspects of injustice addressed in such dis-
courses, such as failing to act on climate change? Are the potential
benefits of a transition disregarded, such as improved public
health, regional development and employment opportunities, or
greater community resilience? A discourse of delay would fail to
do so on both counts, focusing attention only on the short-term
downsides and costs. Climate policies can also be falsely framed as
regressive. For instance, it has been claimed that an aviation tax
would “hammer hard-working families and prevent them from
enjoying their chance to go abroad” (UK Treasury minister
Robert Jenrick), despite this being one of the most progressive
of all potential green taxes on consumption.
The appeal to well-being manifests an extreme version of this
discourse. It claims that climate policy threatens fundamental
livelihoods and living standards: “if fossil fuel use were to end
tomorrow, the economic consequences would be catastrophic
(starvation would follow, for example, as tractors’ fuel tanks ran
dry)” (David J. O’Donnell, Associate Director, Massachusetts
Petroleum Council). This is clearly overstating the disruptive
nature of an orderly transition process, and it is linked to ongoing
efforts to situate fossil fuels as the irreplaceable foundation of
human well-being and poverty reduction – “Abandoning fossil
fuels as quickly as possible, as many environmental activists
demand, would slow the growth that has lifted billions of people
out of poverty” (Bjørn Lomborg, President, Copenhagen
Consensus Centre). Organizations from Peabody Energy to the
influential Southern Baptist Convention have leveraged such
arguments to downplay or deny the need for global climate action
(Supplementary Information, Section 3.9).
The consequence of these concerns is a highly conservative
approach to climate policymaking – policy perfectionism. Here,
one argues for disproportional caution in setting ambitious levels
of climate policy in order not to lose public support – as when
German Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Altmaier
defends a low carbon price on the basis that “we also have a
responsibility for social peace in this country.” Again, this
might be a sensible claim, but it becomes a delay strategy when
the advocate forgoes the need for outreach work and a public
deliberation strategy that could reach consensus on just policies
and build support towards more ambitious solutions.
Emphasizing the downsides of climate action in these ways thus
deflects attention from the harm they avoid, while denying or
ignoring the potential to build inclusive policies that capture
social benefits and reach wide acceptance.
5. Surrender
Is climate change mitigation actually feasible? Policy statements
can become discourses of delay if they raise doubt that mitigation
is (still) possible, pointing to seemingly insurmountable political,
social or biophysical challenges. There are two ways to develop
this final narrative. First, one could claim that strong climate pol-
icies will impinge on society, politics or human nature to the
extent that their final implementation is doomed to failure. We
call this change is impossible, a discourse that reifies the current
state of things and denies the ability of societies to organize
large socio-economic transformations: “To stop emitting waste
carbon completely within the next five or 10 years, we would
need to radically reorient almost all human economic and social
production, a task that’s scarcely imaginable, much less feasible”
(New York Times opinion article). Rather than searching for a
way through these difficulties, change is impossible suggests sur-
rendering or adapting to climate change. It can also support non-
transformative discourses, drawing the solution focus away from
stringent policies towards technology and market-based measures
with minimal interventions, even if these are ultimately insuffi-
cient to address the scale of the problem.
Doomism further argues that any actions we take are too little,
too late. Catastrophic climate change is already locked-in: “The
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climate apocalypse is coming. To prepare for it, we need to admit
that we can’t prevent it” (New Yorker opinion article). Such state-
ments evoke fear and can result in a paralysing state of shock and
resignation (Hulme, 2019). This discourse implies that mitigation
is futile and suggests that the only possible response is adaptation
– or in religious versions, by trusting our fate to “God’s hands”.
As with many other discourses of delay, the surrender category
does not favour the difficult work of building climate engagement
and deliberating over effective solutions.
6. Conclusion
The discourses we identify here can be compelling. They build on
legitimate concerns and fears as societies move closer to addressing
climate change. We argue that they become delay arguments when
they misrepresent rather than clarify, raise adversity rather than
consensus or imply that taking action is an impossible challenge.
Our typology draws out the abstract logic and discursive struc-
ture of delay discourses, but in practice, they often build on com-
binations of arguments. An important illustration is when
population is put forth as an overriding driver of climate change.
This draws from the notion that CO2 emissions trajectories are
essentially fixed in the developed and developing world (change
is impossible), while focusing attention on rapidly growing popu-
lations, usually in the latter (whataboutism). Delay is introduced
because practical and desirable steps to reduce emissions immedi-
ately (e.g., driving smaller cars over shorter distances) are over-
looked in favour of an implied programme of global population
reduction, while simultaneously obscuring the highly unequal dis-
tribution of climate responsibility worldwide. The sophistication
of discourses of delay should therefore not be understated, and
new strategies are developing all the time. As prior research
shows, they are also consistent with – and are repeated alongside
– climate denial and ad hominem frames (Jacques & Knox, 2016).
This article identifies, describes and categorizes discourses of
delay. Our analysis does not reveal their adverse effects on climate
politics at all levels, from regions, nations and communities to
smaller social institutions such as schools, churches and house-
holds. Nor can we judge how often they are used in these contexts
and by whom. These are important avenues of research, requiring
systematic analyses that draw on a variety of document sources
and methods that make use of traditional content analysis, as
well as new developments in computational text mining.
Furthermore, it is critical to investigate how compellingly they
influence behaviours and policy preferences.
How should scientists, climate advocates and policymakers
respond to discourses of climate delay? The recent literature
argues that pre-emptively warning the public about misinforma-
tion can help build resistance and ‘inoculate’ against climate
denial (Farrell et al., 2019; van der Linden et al., 2017). Our char-
acterization and typology of climate delay discourses is a further
step in this direction. It will be a continuing challenge to track
new manifestations and to communicate these to the public.
But this alone will be insufficient. Given the complex normative
grounds on which they are founded, overcoming discourses of cli-
mate delay will require strengthened public deliberation processes
that highlight responsibility, identify appropriate solutions,
address social justice and ultimately show that it is both possible
and desirable to mitigate dangerous climate change.
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